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Workers’ Remittances: An Important 
and Stable Source of External 
Development Finance
Dilip Ratha
AS PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS HAVE DECLINED,workers’ remittances have become an in-creasingly prominent source of external
funding for many developing countries. This chap-
ter examines the relative importance of workers’
remittances as a source of development finance
and discusses measures that industrial and devel-
oping countries could take to increase remittances.
The main messages are:
• Remittance flows are the second-largest source,
behind FDI, of external funding for developing
countries. In 2001, workers’ remittance re-
ceipts of developing countries stood at $72.3
billion, much higher than total official flows
and private non-FDI flows, and 42 percent of
total FDI flows to developing countries (table
7.1). Remittances to low-income countries
were larger as a share of GDP and imports than
were those to middle income countries. Remit-
tances are also more stable than private capital
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flows, which often move pro-cyclically, thus
raising incomes during booms and depressing
them during downturns. By contrast, remit-
tances are less volatile—and may even rise—
in response to economic cycles in the recipient
country. They are expected to rise signifi-
cantly in the long term, once sluggish labor
markets in G-7 economies recover and new
procedures for scrutinizing international trav-
elers become routine.
• Remittances are often invested by the recipi-
ents, particularly in countries with sound eco-
nomic policies. Improvements in policies and
relaxation of foreign exchange controls in the
1990s may have encouraged the use of remit-
tances for investment. 
• By strengthening financial-sector infrastructure
and facilitating international travel, countries
could increase remittance flows, thereby bring-
ing more funds into formal channels. The
transaction costs of fund transfers often exceed
Table 7.1 Remittances received and paid by developing countries in 2001
(billions of dollars)
All developing Low-income Lower middle-income Upper middle-income
Total remittance receipts 72.3 19.2 35.9 17.3
as % of GDP 1.3 1.9 1.4 0.8
as % of imports 3.9 6.2 5.1 2.7
as % of domestic investment 5.7 9.6 5.0 4.9
as % of FDI inflows 42.4 213.5 43.7 21.7
as % of total private capital inflows 42.9 666.1 44.9 20.2
as % of official flows 260.1 120.6 361.7 867.9
Other current transfersa 27.2 6.1 14.0 7.1
Remittances and other current transfers 99.5 25.3 49.9 24.4
Total remittance payments 22.0 1.2 1.7 19.1
excluding Saudi Arabia 6.9 1.2 1.7 4.0
a. Other current transfers include gifts, donations to charities, pensions received by currently retired expatriate workers, and so on. They may
also include personal transfers by migrant workers to families back home. See data annex for more details.
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook 2001; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001.
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20 percent; reducing them by even 5 percentage
points could generate annual savings of $3.5
billion for workers sending money home.
• Facilitating international labor mobility is an
even more crucial—and controversial—means
of increasing remittance flows to developing
countries. Greater international migration
could generate substantial benefits to the world
economy. Developed countries remain wary of
relaxing immigration policies, however, as it is
feared that immigration would increase compe-
tition in local job markets and pose a fiscal bur-
den on local tax payers. Developed countries
also fear that large scale immigration may erode
cultural values and undermine national security.
Developing countries worry about a “brain
drain” even though any output losses from emi-
gration of skilled workers may be more than
offset by remittances and positive network
effects on trade and investment. One positive,
though somewhat limited, step in the direction
of greater international labor mobility is the so-
called Mode-4 proposal for supplying services
under consideration in the current round of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services.
The first section of the chapter analyzes trends
and cycles in workers’ remittances in developing
countries and compares them to other sources of
foreign exchange earnings—among them exports,
private capital, and official flows. The next section
examines the impact of remittances on growth,
investment, and income distribution in recipient
economies. The third section discusses means of
strengthening the infrastructure for sending remit-
tances. The fourth section deals with international
migration—the precondition for remittances. The
final section outlines the near- and long-term out-
looks for remittances flows to, and migration from,
developing countries.
Trends and cycles in workers’
remittances in developing countries
In 2001, remittances to developing countriesfrom overseas resident and nonresident workers
amounted to $72.3 billion or 1.3 percent of GDP
(table 7.1).1 Remittances were smaller than FDI in-
flows, but larger than international capital market
flows during 1999–2001 (figure 7.1). For most of
the 1990s, remittance receipts have exceeded
official development assistance.
As a share of GDP and other key economic
indicators, remittances are significantly higher in
low-income countries than in other developing
countries. In 2001, remittances to low-income
countries were 1.9 percent of GDP and 6.2 percent
of imports; in the upper-middle-income countries
they were 0.8 percent of GDP and 2.7 percent of
imports (figure 7.2). Although in nominal terms
the top recipients of remittances included several
large countries—India, Mexico, and the Philippines
(figure 7.3)—remittances as a share of GDP were
larger in low-income countries (see figure 7.4).
Latin America and the Caribbean were the largest
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Figure 7.1  Workers’ remittances and other inflows,
1998–2001
Billions of dollars
Sources: World Bank, Global Development Finance; IMF, Balance 













Figure 7.2  Remittances as a share of GDP and of
imports, 2001
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recipient of remittances in nominal terms, but rela-
tive to the size of GDP, South Asia was the largest
recipient, with remittances of nearly 2.5 percent of
GDP in 2001 (table 7.2). Remittance flows to Sub-
Saharan Africa were also significant. 
Workers’ remittances are more evenly spread
among developing countries than are capital
flows: the 10 countries that received the most re-
mittances in 2001 received 60 percent of total
remittances to developing countries, significantly
below the top 10’s share of GDP (68 percent),
exports (72 percent), and FDI (74 percent).
The United States and Saudi Arabia are the
largest sources of workers’ remittances to develop-
ing countries. Other top sources are Germany,
Belgium, and Switzerland (figure 7.5). Although
it is difficult to disaggregate the remittance data,
anecdotal evidence suggest that developing coun-
tries may have received nearly $18 billion in 2001












































































































Figure 7.3  Top 20 developing-country recipients of workers’ remittances, 2001
Billions of dollars














































































































Figure 7.4  Top 20 developing-country recipients of workers’ remittances, 2001
Percentage of GDP
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook.
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when its economic boom (driven by oil exports)
subsided, Saudi Arabia was the largest source of
remittance payments in the world (figure 7.6), and
it still is the largest source on a per capita basis.3
A relatively stable source 
of foreign exchange
Remittances were one of the least volatilesources of foreign exchange earnings for de-
veloping countries in the 1990s (see figure 7.1).
While capital flows tend to rise during favorable
economic cycles and fall in bad times, remittances
appear to react less violently and show remarkable
stability over time. For example, remittances to
developing countries continued to rise steadily in
1998–2001 when private capital flows declined in
the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Even the more
stable components of capital flows—FDI and offi-
cial flows—declined in 2000–01, while remit-
tances have continued to rise.
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Table 7.2 Workers’ remittances received by 
developing countries, by region, 1999–2002
Billions of dollars 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total 67 66 72 80
East Asia and Pacific 11 10 10 11
Europe and Central Asia 8 9 9 10
Latin America and the Caribbean 17 19 23 25
Middle East and North Africa 12 11 14 14
South Asia 15 13 14 16
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 3 3 4
As a percentage GDP 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3
East Asia and Pacific 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Europe and Central Asia 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.5
Middle East and North Africa 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.2
South Asia 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.3 0.8 1.0 1.3















































































































Figure 7.5  Top 20 country sources of remittance payments, 2001
Billions of dollars
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook.
0.71.31.5 1.5 1.3















Figure 7.6  The top two sources of remittance
payments, 1970–2001
Billions of dollars
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook.
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Remittances intended for consumption (by
recipient households) should be less volatile than
those intended for investment. Migrants may
increase remittances in times of economic hardship,
especially in low-income countries where their
families may depend significantly on remittances
as a source of income and may live at close to sub-
sistence levels. Economic downturns may also en-
courage workers to migrate abroad—and to begin
transferring funds to families left behind.
Even when the purpose behind remittances is
investment, remittances are less likely to suffer
the sharp withdrawal or euphoric surges that
characterize portfolio flows to emerging markets.
Overseas residents are more likely to continue to
invest in their home country despite economic ad-
versity than are foreign investors, an effect that is
similar to the home-bias in investment (World
Bank 2001). This relative stability has encouraged
some emerging market economies to use remit-
tances as collateral against which to borrow on
international capital markets on substantially bet-
ter terms than they otherwise could (box 7.1).
The banking relationships associated with re-
mittance transfers have also attracted some signifi-
cant FDI deals in developing countries. For banks,
intermediating funds transfers from overseas work-
ers to families back home is a high margin business.
Some authors estimate that remitters collected
about $12 billion in fees in 2001 (Maldonado and
Robledo 2002). While the size of this business itself
is attractive to banks, new customers who start a
relationship with a bank initially for remittance
purposes also bring a host of other businesses. The
large and fast-growing business opportunities asso-
ciated with workers’ remittances have attracted at
least two major FDI deals in Mexico recently. Val-
ued at $12.5 billion, the Citigroup-Banamex deal
in 2001 is the single biggest investment south of the
border for any U.S. company (Wall Street Journal,
December 12, 2002). In December 2002, Bank of
America paid Santander $1.6 billion for part of
Serfin.
Despite greater overall stability, remittances
do respond to dramatic changes in economic activ-
ity in recipient countries. They rose steadily in the
Philippines as the investment climate improved in
the early 1990s, becoming more volatile following
the financial crisis in the late 1990s (figure 7.7).
Similarly, Turkey’s remittance receipts increased
for most of the 1990s but suffered a decline as
the economy slipped into crisis in 1999 and 2000
(figure 7.8). In both cases, however, the decline in
remittances, and the volatility, were smaller than
those of capital flows.
There is some evidence that remittances have
been increasingly used for investment purposes in
developing countries, especially in low-income
countries. Some studies estimate that remittances
from the United States are responsible for almost
161
In recent years, many emerging market issuers haveresorted to future-flow securitization to access interna-
tional markets, often to avoid credit rationing in the face
of deteriorating sovereign risks. Workers’ remittances have
been used quite frequently along with other future-flow
receivables such as oil exports or credit card receivables
(Ketkar and Ratha 2001). In the hierarchy of future flows
that are amenable to international securitization, major
international rating agencies rank electronic remittances in
the same category as airline ticket receivables, credit card
receivables, and telephone receivables, next only to crude
oil exports.
For example, in August 2001 Banco do Brasil issued
$300 million worth of bonds (with five year maturity) using
as collateral future yen remittances from Brazilian workers
in Japan. The terms of these bonds were significantly more
generous than those available on sovereign issues. Rated
BBB+ by Standard and Poors, these securities were several
notches higher than Brazil’s sovereign foreign currency rat-
ing BB– at the time. Other countries, such as El Salvador,
Mexico, Panama, and Turkey, have also used future work-
ers’ remittance-backed securities to raise external financing.
Assuming that about half of all recorded remittances pass
through the banking system, and assuming an over-
collateralization ratio of 5:1, developing country issuers
could potentially raise about $7 billion a year using future
remittance-backed securitization. However, developing coun-
tries should carefully weigh the trade-off between lower bor-
rowing costs and longer maturities that securitized debt of-
fers and the inflexibility associated with servicing such debt. 
Source: Ketkar and Ratha 2001.
Box 7.1 Securitizing future flows of workers’ remittances
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one-fifth of the capital invested in microenter-
prises in urban Mexico (Woodruff and Zenteno
2001).4 Similarly, in the Arab Republic of Egypt, a
large proportion of returning migrants in the late
1980s set up their own enterprises using funds
brought back from abroad5 (McCormick and
Wahba 2002). As low-income countries lifted
exchange restrictions and liberalized their current
and capital accounts in the 1990s, remittance re-
ceipts rose sharply, and the volatility of remittances
also rose, presumably because these remittances
were used for investment purposes (figure 7.9).6
Cross-country comparison reveals that remit-
tances are affected by the investment climate in
recipient countries in the same manner as capital
flows—though to a much lesser degree. During
1996–2000, for example, remittance receipts aver-
aged 0.5 percent of GDP in countries with a higher-
than-median level of corruption (as indicated by
the index of the International Corruption Research
Group) compared to 1.9 percent in countries with
lower-than-median corruption (table 7.3). Coun-
tries that were more open (in terms of their
trade/GDP ratio) or more financially developed
(M2/GDP) also received larger remittances.
In contrast to capital flows, however, remit-
tances were significantly higher in countries that
were high-risk (as measured by their Institutional
Investor rating) and had a high level of debt rela-
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Figure 7.7  Remittances and private capital flows to the Philippines, 1978–2001
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Figure 7.8  Remittances and private capital flows to Turkey, 1978–2001
Billions of dollars
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payments; World Bank, Global Development Finance database.
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more migrants looking for better incomes.8 For
example, remittance payments from the United
States surged in tandem with the strong economic
growth in the second half of the 1990s. Led by the
information-technology sector, the boom caused
the United States to revise its immigration policies
to enable companies to hire more technology
workers from abroad.9 Remittance payments from
Saudi Arabia rose during the oil boom years of
the 1970s and early 1980s, but declined in the mid-
1980s as oil prices fell, the budget deficit mounted,
and the government put limits on hiring foreign
workers.10
Remittances may remain stable even in eco-
nomic downturns in source developed countries,
however. The source developed countries often
have fiscal systems with automatic stabilizers that
may offer some income protection to migrant
workers during economic downturns. Taylor
(2000) found that public income transfer schemes
in the United States resulted in increased remittances
to Mexico—other things being equal, immigrant
households that received Social Security or unem-
ployment insurance were 10 to 15 percent more
likely to remit, and their monthly remittances
abroad (especially Mexico) were $150 to $200
higher, than immigrant households not receiving
public transfers. Another reason for the relative
stability of remittances in the face of economic
downturns in source countries may be that if mi-
grant workers are forced to return to their home
country, they may bring back their entire savings
(which shows up as migrants’ transfers in the bal-
ance of payments). This may have been the case
in India during the Gulf War of 1990–91 which
forced a large number of Indian workers in the Gulf
to return home, but remittances to India did not
decline (figure 7.10). (Unlike India, however, remit-
tance flows to Jordan and Yemen from Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia declined during the Gulf War.)
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Figure 7.9  Volatility of remittances in the 1990s
Standard deviation/mean


















Table 7.3 Workers’ remittance receipts in
developing countries relative to key indicators
(as a percentage of GDP, 1996–2000)
High Low
Corruption 0.5 1.9




Country risk 2.4 1.0
(Institutional Investor rating)
Note: High and low usually refer to above and below the median
for the concerned variable. The numbers reported are the sum of
remittances of all countries in the group divided by the sum of GDP
of the same countries. Average remittances and average GDP during
1996–2000 are used for each country included in these calculations.
Lesotho is excluded from these computations.
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators; World Bank,
Global Development Finance; IMF balance-of-payments data,
World Bank staff estimates.
Table 7.4 Remittances relative to growth rate 
by income group
(remittances as a percentage of GDP, 1996–2000)
Poor countries Other
Higher than median growth 3.4 1.0
Lower than median growth 4.2 0.8
Note: Poor countries and other developing countries are defined as
in GDF 2002.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; World Bank,
Global Development Finance; IMF balance-of-payments data;
World Bank staff estimates.
mentioned earlier, that low-income countries, which
are usually high-risk, receive relatively more remit-
tances as a share of GDP than do countries with
higher incomes. In fact, in 1996–2000 remittances
tended to be higher in poor countries that had
lower than median growth rates, probably because
most remittances to low-income countries that are
performing poorly are for consumption. By con-
trast, middle-income countries with higher-than-
median growth rates had higher remittances, pre-
sumably because remittances tend to behave more
like investment flows in these countries (table 7.4).
As one would expect, remittance flows are
affected by the economic cycle of the source coun-
tries. An upturn in the source country increases the
income earned by migrant workers. It also attracts
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Economic effects of remittances
Remittances augment the recipient individuals’incomes and increase the recipient country’s
foreign exchange reserves. If remittances are in-
vested, they contribute to output growth, and if
they are consumed, then also they generate posi-
tive multiplier effects (see, for example, Stahl and
Arnold 1986). Thus, remittances offset some of the
output losses that a developing country may suffer
from emigration of its highly skilled workers.11
Adelman and Taylor (1990) found that for every
dollar Mexico received from migrants working
abroad, its GNP increased by $2.69 to $3.17, de-
pending on whether remittances were received by
urban or rural households.12 Remittances also more
than offset the loss of tax revenue in most develop-
ing countries. For example, the net fiscal loss asso-
ciated with Indian emigration to the United States
was estimated at 0.24 to 0.58 percent of Indian
GDP in 2001 (Desai, Kapur, and McHale 2001b),
but remittances amounted to at least 2.1 percent
of GDP in the same year. In the case of unskilled
workers who emigrate to escape unemployment,
remittances are likely to prove an even clearer net
gain to the developing country.
Inward remittances are believed to have a pos-
itive impact on savings and investment. Household
surveys in Pakistan indicated that in the later
1980s and early 1990s, the marginal propensity
to save was higher (0.711) for income from inter-
national remittances than from domestic urban-
rural remittances (0.49) or rental income (0.085)
(Adams 2002 and 1998). Furthermore, such
transfers provide the hard currency required for
importing scarce inputs that are not available do-
mestically. Remittances may serve as insurance
policies against risks associated with new produc-
tion activities (Taylor 1999). Faini (2001) found
that remittances have a positive effect on growth.
As mentioned earlier, remittances were a source of
investment in Mexico and the Arab Republic of
Egypt. Remittances are used in many countries to
build schools and clinics (for example, see Martin,
Martin, and Weil 2002 for a study of remittances
sent to Mali from France; see also Orozco 2000).
Lucas (1985) estimated that in five Sub-Saharan
African countries, emigration (to work in South
African mines) reduced labor supply and crop pro-
duction in the short run, but enhanced crop pro-
ductivity and cattle accumulation through invested
remittances in the long run.
The evidence on the impact of remittances on
income inequality is mixed. Remittances augment
incomes and can lift people out of poverty. Some
studies argue that remittances may have had an
equalizing effect on the distribution of income
among socioeconomic groups in Mexico (Taylor
1999; Adelman and Taylor 1990). But remittances
may also raise inequality because rich (workers)
are better able to pay the high fixed costs associ-
ated with international travel.13 Indeed, household
survey data from Pakistan reveal that the share of
income originating from external remittances rose
with the income groups—the highest income
group received the highest share of income from
external remittances (table 7.5). Such patterns may
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Figure 7.10  India’s remittance receipts, 1985–2001
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Remittances do not necessarily go to countries
with poor income distribution, however. During
1996–2000 remittances were nearly twice as high
(1.5 percent of GDP) in countries that had rela-
tively even income distribution (represented by
Gini index) than in other countries (0.9 percent of
GDP). Some studies argue that remittances increase
urban-rural inequality as they tend to finance in-
vestments in real estate or in enterprises in urban
areas. McCormick and Wahba (2002) found that
returning migrants in the Arab Republic of Egypt
in 1988 tended to set up enterprises in greater
Cairo; however, this may have been due to distor-




Despite the clear welfare benefits of remit-tances, weaknesses in the financial sector and
in government administration impose substantial
transaction costs on migrant workers who send
them. Easing these constraints could increase re-
mittance receipts, while bringing a larger share of
remittance payments into the formal financial
system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that inefficien-
cies in the banking system—long delays in check
clearance, exchange losses, or improper disclosure
of transaction costs14—deter inward remittances.
The average cost of transferring remittances to
Central and South America is in the range of 13 per-
cent, and often exceeds 20 percent (figure 7.11; see
also Orozco 2002).15 These charges, which are as-
tronomical in comparison with the costs of bank
transfers among industrial economies, are largely
due to the fixed cost of wire transfers combined with
the fact that the average remittance transaction tends
to be small, usually below $200. Reducing such
transactions costs to less than 10 percent would
imply an annual savings of $3.5 billion to overseas
workers. No doubt a substantial portion of this sav-
ings would be remitted.
Improved banking sector technology could
substantially reduce transaction costs by expediting
check clearance, reducing exchange losses, and im-
proving disclosure, especially in rural areas in devel-
oping countries. One promising approach is to es-
tablish partnerships between leading banks and the
government post office network in countries that do
not have banks with extensive branch networks in
rural areas. Remittance activities may also be at-
tractive for banks, as margins can be very high.
Banks in many developing countries have not
shown much interest in workers’ remittances in the
past, presumably because of cumbersome paper-
work and lack of widespread branch networks.
This is beginning to change, however. The efforts to
crack down on money laundering and financing
terrorism have affected remittances through the
informal networks, and a large number of workers
are looking for formal banking channels to remit
funds. These developments, and the high margins
associated with this business, have attracted some
new entrants. For example, the International Re-
mittance Network has started offering funds trans-
fer services by linking credit union cooperatives
(such as of unionized agricultural workers) with
165
Table 7.5 Remittances by income group 
in Pakistan, 1986–87 to 1990–91
Average income Percentage of per
per capita capita income
(1986 rupees, from external
5-year average) remittances
Lowest 20% 1,176 1.0
Second 20% 1,721 1.7
Third 20% 2,200 4.8
Fourth 20% 2,876 7.2
Highest 20% 5,261 13.8
Source: Adams 1998, based on a survey of 469 Pakistani
households during 1986–87 and 1990–91.
Figure 7.11  Average transfer fee and exchange-rate
commission for sending $200, February 2000
Percentage of amount transferred
Note: The exchange-rate commission for Cuba and El Salvador is zero.
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Citibank branches in the United States and in re-
ceiving countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Mexico. Reportedly, the cost of remittance
through this new network is only $6.50 per transac-
tion, significantly lower than the costs of using
informal networks.
Industrial countries should consider facilitat-
ing efforts to reduce the transaction costs of remit-
tances to developing countries. Mexico and the
United States are already collaborating to provide
better financial services to Mexican migrants (in-
cluding illegal immigrants), an effort that promises
to significantly improve the migrants’ access and
use of banking services, especially for wiring funds
to families back home. Such policies—including
measures to improve disclosure16 in fund transfers—
are likely also to benefit the source-country (by
generating more tax revenues), as well as banks
(by generating fees for fund transfers and other
banking services).
Recent surveys of migrants in Los Angeles and
New York show that migrants are discouraged
from opening bank accounts because of minimum
balance requirements—and to a lesser extent,
stringent identification requirements. When these
obstacles are eased—for example, by accepting
Mexican consulates’ matrículas or IRS’s individual
taxpayer identification numbers17 as valid forms
of identification—immigrants can become the
source of substantial banking business over and
beyond wire transfers (box 7.2). In recent years,
“financial fairs” have been held to promote remit-
tances and encourage migrant workers to use the
formal banking system (box 7.3).
Facilitating international labor
mobility
Facilitating labor mobility between source anddestination countries is perhaps the most
crucial—and controversial—means of increasing
remittance flows to developing countries. Even
though world migration pressures have risen, the
progress of globalization has been slower in the area
of migration (Hatton and Williamson 2002, World
Bank 2002) than in trade (Findlay and O’Rourke
2002) and capital flows (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002).
The main concerns of developed countries
regarding immigration center on (a) the local job-
seekers’ fear of competition from migrant workers,
(b) the fiscal burden that may result on native tax-
payers for providing health and social security to
migrants, (c) fears of erosion of cultural identity
and problems of assimilation of immigrants, and
(d) national security (especially after September 11,
2001). 
On the first issue, conceptually increased labor
supply due to immigration is expected to depress
wages or raise the unemployment rate. Empirical
evidence, however, has remained inconclusive as
researchers have been unable to isolate the effects
of immigration from those of other factors such as
differences (between local workers and migrants)
in skills, sex, age, and professional education and
166
For decades, Mexican consulates have been issuing asimple identity card, known as matrícula consular, to
Mexican citizens living in the United States—legally or ille-
gally. According to a study by the Pew Hispanic Center
(2002), 740,000 matrículas were issued in the United
States during the first nine months of 2002. Designed orig-
inally to help police identify persons involved in accidents
(or crime), matrículas are increasingly accepted as proof of
identity when opening accounts at U.S. banks. Some 66
banks (and 801 police departments in 13 states in the
United States) now accept the matrícula as a valid
identification document. (More recently, U.S. banks are
showing reluctance in accepting these documents because
of concerns about illegal funds tranfers.) 
At present, only the Mexican government offers such
an identification document to its citizens abroad. Several
Central American governments are also considering such
cards, which would help their migrant population obtain a
bank account and use banks to transfer funds cheaply and
transparently.
Source: Pew Hispanic Center. 
Box 7.2 Mexican matrículas consulares 
boost remittances
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experience obtained abroad (Coppel, Dumont, and
Visco 2001). The dynamic nature of this problem
has made it more difficult to assess the effects of
migration on labor supply. For example, local
workers may move to another location and this
may show up as lower employment in their orig-
inal location, but it would be hard to attribute
this fall in employment rate to immigration (see
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997; Borjas 1994).
Some studies that distinguish between long run
and short run impact find that in response to im-
migration, while unemployment may increase in
the short run, in the long run the overall rate of
unemployment falls permanently (Gross 1999).
The effects of immigration on wages are found to
have been negative as expected. Borjas, Freeman,
and Katz (1997) found that the 21 percent in-
crease in the number of unskilled migrant workers
in the United States from 1975 to 1995 reduced
the wage earnings of unskilled local workers by up
to 5 percent, not a small amount considering that
wages should have increased during this period.
(See also World Bank 2002.) 
Although the potential adverse effect of immi-
gration on unemployment and wage rates receives
a lot of attention, immigration also generates many
positive effects. First, migrant workers may relieve
the labor shortage in many areas in which native
workers do not want to work, and where there
were also no substitutes for human labor (e.g., car-
ing for the elderly). Migration may thus increase
productivity and moderate inflation as was the
case in the United States (especially in the technol-
ogy sector) in the 1990s. Second, migrant workers
tend to be more responsive to labor market con-
ditions than local workers; thus, migration may
Developing countries interested in increasing remittanceflows from the United States can benefit from the ex-
periences of some innovative “financial fairs” organized in
August 2002 in Kansas City and Chicago. Recognizing the
multifaceted potential of migrant workers as a source of
remittances, tax revenues, and savings, the Community
Affairs Office of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion staged the fairs in collaboration with the Mexican
Consulate, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and six pri-
vate banks. All participants appeared to benefit from the
event. 
At the fairs, the Mexican consulate issued an identifi-
cation card (matrícula) with photo and U.S. address to
undocumented migrant workers from Mexico. The IRS
collected back taxes from workers and issued individual
taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs) on the spot, spar-
ing everyone the 6–8-week wait. The tax payments entitled
workers who were becoming legal residents to claim earned
income tax credits—good for an average tax refund of
about $1,700 per year—once their papers were processed.
The banks accepted the matrícula and ITIN as identifica-
tion from migrants wishing to open bank accounts.
Already legalized workers were able to receive earned
income tax credits on the spot; some deposited their tax
refunds in their newly opened bank accounts.
The documentation requirement for opening new ac-
counts (according to section 326 of the Patriot Act) allows
other forms of identification such as passports or even
voter registration cards. Some financial institutions (such
as U.S. Bank in Kansas City and Second Federal Savings in
Chicago) have started accepting voter registration cards as
valid identification documents. Following the Mexican
model, the Guatemalan consulate has also started issuing
identification cards to its citizens in the United States. The
cards are accepted by Wells Fargo for opening bank
accounts.
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Box 7.3 Financial fairs to promote remittances and
good banking habits among migrants
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help soften labor market rigidities and improve
productivity (Coppel, Dumont, and Visco 2001).
Third, the multiplier effects generated by migrants’
spending in the host countries should not be un-
derestimated. Finally, the competition faced by local
less skilled workers in developed countries from
migrant workers is “neither more nor less than the
challenge posed to such workers by imports of
labor intensive goods from developing countries”
(Winters forthcoming).
On the question of whether immigrants are a
fiscal burden on destination industrial countries,
again the evidence is mixed. Smith and Edmonston
(1997) conclude that immigrants with less than a
high school education continue to be a fiscal bur-
den into the next generations, but that skilled im-
migrants pay more in taxes than what they receive
in social security from the state. Other studies
have argued that even in the case of unskilled im-
migrants, the fiscal costs, if any, are limited to the
first generation; it is believed that the next gen-
eration earns and contributes more in taxes than
the corresponding generation of native workers
(Borjas 1994). Another contentious point is that
the fiscal burden is usually borne by localities, with
the federal/national governments getting benefits.
Fiscal costs are obviously reduced if migrant work-
ers did not stay in the country until they are eligible
to receive social security. Some policy makers have
suggested greater use of temporary unskilled work-
ers (as in the Mexican guest workers proposal of
U.S. Senator Phil Gramm).18 However, enforce-
ment of such “revolving door” policies may prove
extremely difficult (Mattoo 2002, introduction).
The social costs of immigration, including
cultural fears, crime, and national security, are not
quantifiable and will continue to act as brakes
against attempts to liberalize immigration laws in
advanced countries. However, the rising migration
trend is unlikely to be reversed as these costs have
to be traded off against the benefits of letting in
more immigrants at the margin (Winters 2002).
Considering the huge income gap between
rich and poor countries, most economists and de-
veloping country policy-makers see large benefits
in greater international mobility of labor. Winters
(forthcoming) estimates that world welfare would
increase by more than $150 billion per year if de-
veloped countries were to increase their quotas of
international temporary workers to 3 percent of
their workforce. (See also Rodrik 2001.) 
For developing countries, the benefits of mi-
gration—and its costs—are more obvious. Coun-
tries benefit from workers’ remittances and from
the rise in real wages (especially for unskilled and
unemployed workers) that often occurs as emigra-
tion clears the labor market. On the negative side,
the emigration of highly skilled workers has been
linked to skill shortages, reductions in output,
and tax shortfalls in many developing countries.
Such burdens appear even heavier for countries
where educated workers emigrated in large num-
bers after receiving highly subsidized technical ed-
ucation. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) esti-
mate that over one-third of individuals with
tertiary education from Africa, the Caribbean, and
Central America emigrated to the United States
and other countries of the OECD. Migration rates
are also high in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Turkey. The International Organization for Migra-
tion (1999) estimates that for 40 percent of
African countries, more than 35 percent of college
graduates reside abroad. Desai, Kapur, and
McHale (2001b) discuss the emigration of a signif-
icant share of India’s information-technology pro-
fessionals to the United States in the late 1990s.
They estimate forgone income-tax revenues as-
sociated with that emigration to be one-third of
current Indian income-tax receipts.
The negative effects of brain drain are offset to
some extent by inward remittances from migrant
workers. Source developing countries may also
benefit from network effects (business contacts,
investments, technological help) from their skilled
and successful emigrants abroad (Desai, Kapur,
and McHale 2001b). And it is debatable whether
the skilled workers, had they not emigrated, would
have been used to their full potential given the
imperfect work environment in many developing
countries.19 Finally, skilled workers may return to
their home country if the investment climate and
work environment improve.
From limiting to managing migration
Bhagwati (2003) believes that developed coun-tries should shift the focus of their immigration
policies from limiting to managing migration. The
goal of such a shift would be to glean the shared
benefits of greater international labor mobility and
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to avoid the undesirable effects of immigration
quotas—chief among which are the sufferings of
those trying to cross borders illegally and the abuse
of illegal immigrants. For their part, developing
countries could benefit by adopting a “diaspora
approach” in dealing with the emigration of work-
ers, exploiting their potential as a source of capital,
remittances and other transfers; building “net-
works” for trade, tourism, investment promotion,
and training youngsters at home; and otherwise
harnessing their knowledge, skills, and assets for
economic development.20 At the very least, devel-
oping countries could remove the hurdles that
their nationals may face in undertaking overseas
travel.21
Immigration policies in developed countries
are so complex that making a direct investment
in a developing country is often less cumbersome
than bringing in workers to a developed country
(Mattoo 2002). To improve transparency in im-
migration policies Bhagwati (2003) proposes a
World Migration Organization that would codify
immigration policies and spread best practices.
Rodrik (2001) similarly proposes “multilateraliz-
ing” immigration rules so that two countries par-
ticipating in a special arrangement to share work-
ers would not generate adverse spillover effects on
other countries.
One positive, albeit limited, step in this direc-
tion is the so-called Mode 4 proposal for supply-
ing services under consideration in the current
round of the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (GATS). The agreement proposes greater
freedom for the “temporary movement of individ-
ual service suppliers.”22 Although little progress
was made when this issue was first negotiated in
the Uruguay Round, the member countries of the
WTO now seem more willing to negotiate. How-
ever, the Mode 4 trade proposal is presently lim-
ited in scope to managers, executives, and profes-
sionals; thus, countries that are not significant
foreign investors and those with unskilled workers
are not going to benefit much from progress in the
current negotiations.
Prospects for remittance flows 
to developing countries
Remittance flows have shown remarkable sta-bility over time, and the rising trend evident in
recent years is likely to continue in the medium- to
long-term. In particular, remittance flows from
nonresident or temporary workers are expected
to surge in the medium-term. The search for lower
costs is driving multinational corporations to hire
overseas workers for cross-border jobs. This trend
towards more mobility of temporary workers may
be reinforced if progress is made on Mode 4 trade
in services in the GATS negotiations. Improvements
in transportation and communications will com-
plement this trend.
Migration pressure is likely to continue to rise
in the foreseeable future (box 7.4).23 The most
important factor in the rise is perhaps the aging of
the population—and the implied surge in pension
costs—in the developed nations (see, for example,
United Nations 2000). Since skilled workers pay
more taxes and need less support from state social
security systems, future changes to immigration
policies are likely to favor permanent-skilled and
temporary-unskilled migrants (Desai, Kapur, and
McHale 2001a).
In addition to differential changes in depen-
dency ratios, Hatton and Williamson (2002) iden-
tified three historical economic determinants of
world migration:
• Wide wage gaps between developed and de-
veloping countries
• High but falling costs of migration relative to
the low incomes in developing countries
• The size of existing migrant stocks in receiv-
ing countries (which affects the extent of in-
flux of friends and relatives through family
reunification).
Economic growth in some parts of the developing
world, for example, East Asia and South Asia, may
imply less migration pressure from these regions,
but it is unlikely to reduce the migration pressure
from Africa. Also South-South migration is likely
to increase faster than South-North migration as
many fast-growing newly industrialized countries
in the South are expected to attract more migra-
tion than the industrial countries (Hatton and
Williamson 2002). (The only factor that may mod-
erate migration is the casualty from HIV/AIDS.)
The possible induction of up to 10 Central and
Eastern European countries into the EU is also
likely to increase migration from these countries
into the EU, but movement of temporary workers is
especially likely to surge.24
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However, in the near to medium term, this
positive outlook for remittance flows to develop-
ing countries needs to be moderated in view of
the sluggish labor markets in G-7 economies and
tighter scrutiny of international travelers following
the events of September 1, 2001—factors that are
likely to change the geographical composition, as
well as the volume, of remittance flows. Given the
geopolitical risks of war and conflicts, developing
countries in the Middle East and North Africa
region and South Asia who supply workers to
countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are
likely to experience some declines in remittance
flows. Increased migration from central and east-
ern Europe, after the EU enlargement, may crowd
out migration from other countries. These declines
are, however, likely to be dominated by positive ef-
fects on remittance flows of greater labor mobility,
progress in (Mode 4) GATS negotiations, depend-
ing on how quickly G-7 economies overcome the
economic down cycle.
In 1994, about 3.6 million persons were on the waitinglist for admission to the United States (Hatton and
Williamson 2002, Smith and Edmonston 1997). Each year
a million people enter the United States legally, 500,000
illegally. The numbers are similar in Europe. Immigration
to many Asian countries—among them the Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand—surged in the
1990s. And the number of asylum seekers remains high.
Worldwide asylum applications reached 914,855 in 2001,
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, with about 940,226 cases awaiting decision.
As demand for migration has risen, so have payments
to human traffickers. Fees range from $200–400 along the
Mexico-Los Angeles route to $35,000 along the China-
New York (see table). 
The fees paid to coyotes, professional people-
smugglers along the U.S.-Mexican border “have doubled,
tripled or even quadrupled, depending on the entry corri-
dor and the services offered” (Cornelius 2001). Although
this increase is due in part to stricter border enforcement
(the total INS budget for the 2002 fiscal year was $5.5 bil-
lion, more than triple what it was in 1993; the size of the
Border Patrol has more than doubled in size since then), it
is also due to rising demand for migration.






Arab states-United Arab Emirates 2,000–3,000
North-Africa-Spain 2,000–3,500
Iraq-Europe 4,100–5,000
Middle East-United States 1,000–15,000
Mexico-Los Angeles 200–400
Philippines-Indonesia/Malaysia 3,500
Source: “Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe,” Interna-
tional Organization for Migration, 2000 (as reproduced in The Economist,
Survey of Migration, November 2, 2002).
Box 7.4 World migration pressure is high—and rising
Annex: Sources of remittance data
IN THIS STUDY, WORKERS’ REMITTANCESare defined as the sum of three components:(a) workers’ remittances recorded under the
heading “current transfers” in the current account
of the balance of payments; (b) compensation of
employees which includes wages, salaries, and
other benefits of border, seasonal, and other non-
resident workers (such as local staff of embassies)
and which are recorded under the “income” sub-
category of the current account; and (c) migrants’
transfers which are reported under “capital trans-
fers” in the capital account of the IMF’s Balance of
Payments Yearbook (item codes 2391, 2310, and
2431 respectively).
This broader definition is believed to capture
the extent of workers’ remittances better than the
data reported under the heading of workers’ re-
mittances alone. In the Philippines, for example,
remittances from overseas Filipino workers
through the banking system are largely recorded
under compensation of employees (which, strictly
speaking, should include only remittances by tem-
porary workers). In the year 2001, compensation
of employees amounted to $6.2 billion whereas
workers’ remittances were just $122 million. In
contrast, in India, most remittances reported by
authorized dealers are captured under workers’
remittances (nearly $10 billion in 2001), and the
compensation-of-employees figure ($126 million
in 2000) is known to be underestimated. In Turkey,
workers’ remittances exclude other current trans-
fer credits such as “imports with waiver,” that is,
imports financed from the earnings of Turkish na-
tionals living abroad; this item needs to be added
to remittances.25
The above definition does not include transfers
through informal channels—such as hand-carries by
friends or family members, or in-kind remittances of
171
.
jewelry, clothes, and other consumer goods, or
through hawala. These are believed to be significant
in many countries, ranging from 10 to 50 percent of
total remittances, but often are not recorded in the
official statistics (Puri and Ritzema 2000; El-Qorchi
and others 2002). If and when they are recorded, it is
not clear to what extent they reflect actual transfers
rather than imports. For example, in recent years
India has started recording as imports gold brought
in by incoming international passengers, previously
this was classified as remittances. Thus, data for pri-
vate transfers in recent years show a slight decline,
even though substantially nothing has changed.
The unrecorded portion of remittances may be
heading down due to better technology and efforts
to crack down on money laundering. These
changes make it difficult to interpret current
trends. For example, in the first nine months of
2002 remittances to Mexico were up 9.9 percent
over the previous year; how much of this rise re-
flects better reporting and how much a rise in un-
derlying activity is difficult to tell. More extreme is
the case of Pakistan which recorded a whopping
$2.4 billion in remittance receipts in fiscal year
2002, more than double the $1.1 billion recorded a
year earlier (table 7A.1). According to the State
Bank of Pakistan (2002), “the turning point was
the international crackdown on the Hundi net-
Table 7A.1 Workers’ remittance inflows to
Pakistan, fiscal 1999–2002
(millions of dollars)
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02
Total 1,060 984 1,087 2,389
From U.S. 82 80 135 779
From U.K. 74 73 81 152
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report, 2001–02.
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work” (especially in the United States and Britain,
after September 11, 2001); the other reason might
have been the “waning attraction of foreign ex-
change holdings due to an appreciating Rupee.”
Nor does the definition include “other current
transfers,” which often reflect workers’ remittances.
Remittances are supposed to be current trans-
actions that do not involve transfers of ownership
of assets. In practice, however, it may be difficult
to identify or estimate such transactions. For ex-
ample, remittances can be masked as capital in-
flows to take advantage of tax and other incen-
tives. In many countries, nonresident deposits,
although classified under the capital account, may
in part reflect workers’ remittances. For example,
the nonresident rupee deposits in India are most
likely remittances disguised as deposits—upon ma-
turity, they do not return to the nonresident depos-
itor, because the rupee is not convertible into hard
currency. 
As with most of the items in the global bal-
ance of payments, the estimates of remittances
suffer from the fact that inflows and outflows re-
ported by countries do not match. World inflows
of remittances totaled $111 billion in 2001—more
than 7 percent higher than recorded outward flows
($103 billion).
Notes
1. Remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ remit-
tances, compensation of employees and migrants’ transfers
(see data annex). Remittances are known to be underesti-
mated significantly in the balance-of-payments statistics of
the IMF. If other current transfers—which cover food, cloth-
ing, consumer goods, medical supplies, gifts, dowries, pay-
ments from unfunded pension plans from nongovernmental
organizations, and so on—were also to be included, remit-
tance receipts would amount to $99.5 billion or 1.6 percent
of GDP in 2001. A frequent practice in the literature is to also
include migrants’ transfers in remittance receipts. See annex
for a discussion of data issues relating to remittances. Remit-
tance payments by developing countries stood at $22 billion
in 2001. Most of this amount ($15.1 billion) was paid by
Saudi Arabia.
2. One reason why remittance flow data are not disag-
gregated by source countries or by destination countries is
that financial institutions that act as intermediaries often
report funds as originating in the most immediate source
country. For example, the Philippines tends to attribute a
large part of its remittance receipts to the United States
because many banks route their fund transfers through
the United States. Orozco (2002) suggests that more than
90 percent of remittance flows to Latin American countries
originate in the United States.
3. These numbers do not reflect Saudi Arabia’s indirect
contribution to remittance flows in the form of training un-
skilled workers, many of whom arrive as unskilled workers
in Saudi Arabia and then migrate to other developed coun-
tries after acquiring substantial skills. 
4. Some governments are trying to encourage the use
of remittances for investment purposes. For example,
government bodies in Zacatecas, in northern Mexico, give
three dollars for every dollar contributed by migrants’ asso-
ciations for investment projects (The Economist, February
21, 2002).
5. The funds brought back by return migrants is re-
ported as migrants’ transfers in the balance of payments.
Unfortunately very few countries report this as a separate
item. Presumably a large part of this item is already included
in remittance receipts. Among the developing countries, only
the Russian Federation reports any sizeable amount of
migrants’ transfers; but even there, the size has steadily de-
clined, from $4.5 billion in 1994 to $417 million in 2001.
The aggregate migrants’ transfers to developing countries as
reported in the IMF balance-of-payments statistics was only
about $1 billion in 2001.
6. For example remittances rose sharply when countries
allowed residents to hold onshore foreign currency deposits.
Private transfers to Uganda increased from $80 million in
1991 to $415 million in 1996 in response to measures that
permitted residents to open foreign currency accounts on-
shore (Kasekende 2000). In October 2002, Uganda’s foreign
exchange accounts deposits were 27.8 percent of all deposits.
7. See also Russell (1992, p. 277), Meyers (1998), and
Elbadawi and Rocha (1992). Reinforcing this argument,
El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) found that inflation had a
positive and significant impact on inflow of remittances,
probably reflecting the need to boost family support in
times of rising prices.
8. Swamy (1981) argues that the economic situation in
the host country is the main determinant of the size of re-
mittance flows to developing countries. Straubhaar (1986)
similarly argues that “international migration flows are
demand-determined by the existence of restrictive immigra-
tion control systems.”
9. See Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2002) and
World Bank (2002) for a description of changes in U.S. im-
migration rules and trends. The increase in remittance flows
to developing countries coincided with an increase in the
migrant population in developed countries. Estimates sug-
gest that migrant stocks in developed countries increased
from 3.1 percent in 1965 to 4.5 percent in 1990 (Hatton
and Williamson 2002); in all likelihood this trend has con-
tinued through the 1990s.
10. The decline in remittances from Gulf countries in
the mid-1980s was most likely due to restrictions on hiring
new workers from overseas. Birks, Seccombe, and Sinclair
(1986) reported that the collapse of oil prices did not result
in large-scale exodus of foreign labor from the Arab Gulf
states. Remittances intended for investment purposes may
decline when the source country’s economy is strong and
rates of return are high. El-Sakka and McNabb (1999)
found that remittance inflows to Egypt were lower when
rates of return were higher in Arab source countries during
1967–91.
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11. The same skilled workers could be significantly less
productive in a developing country (where the unemploy-
ment rate is higher and investment climate worse) than in an
industrial country. See also Nayyar (1994).
12. Rural households tend to consume more domesti-
cally produced goods—and hence generate larger multiplier
effects—than urban households.
13. Adams (1993) found from Egyptian household survey
data collected in the second half of the 1980s that the relation-
ship between migration and income had an inverted U-shape,
suggesting that it is the middle-income types who migrate; the
very poor do not migrate because they cannot pay the costs as-
sociated with international travel, while the very rich do not
want to migrate. After adding land to income, he dismissed this
view and concluded that it is the very poor who migrate be-
cause they have the most to gain from migrating (and they are
able to meet travel costs by presumably selling land).
14. A 2002 survey by the Pew Hispanic Center (spon-
sored by the Interamerican Development Bank) of 302 Latin
American born adults residing in Los Angeles and Miami also
found that remitters had significant concerns about the high
cost of transferring funds due to flat fees and unfavorable ex-
change rates. Other concerns include delays in money being
delivered to the recipient. This survey revealed that nearly
83 percent of persons interviewed sent money through inter-
national money transfer companies such as Western Union or
Moneygram, and only 9 percent through banks. The Bank of
Mexico (1997) estimated that in 1995, 40 percent of remit-
tances came in through money orders, 24 percent through
wire transfers, 27 percent through other electronic means, and
8 percent through cash transfers. Lozano-Ascencio (1998),
using surveys of migrants themselves, estimates that 15 per-
cent of remittances entered Mexico as pocket transfers.
15. The cost of transfers through informal channels,
such as Hawala, used in other parts of the world is said
to be much lower than it is through institutional channels
(El-Qorchi 2002).
16. In 2001, the United States amended the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act (see the Wire Transfer Fairness and
Disclosure Act of 2001), instructing financial institutions or
money transmitters initiating an international money transfer
to prominently disclose the exchange rate used in the transac-
tion, the exchange rate prevailing at a major financial center
of the foreign country as of close of business on the business
day immediately preceding the transaction date, all commis-
sions and fees charged, and the exact amount of foreign cur-
rency to be received by the customer in the foreign country
(see www.ncua.gov, H.R. 1306—Wire Transfer Services).
17. An individual taxpayer identification number
(ITIN) is required to open interest-bearing accounts in U.S.
banks. Without an ITIN, only checking accounts that do
not pay interest can be opened.
18. Senator Gramm has proposed that Mexican “guest
workers” be hired on an annual or seasonal basis, and a
15.3 percent payroll tax imposed on their employers would
pay for the worker’s emergency medical care and an IRA
account, which the worker could withdraw at the time of
departure back to Mexico. See http://migration.ucdavis.edu/
rmn/archive_rmn/oct_2001-10rmn.html.
19. Nayyar (1994) argues that the magnitudes of emi-
gration from India are small compared to the substantial
reservoir of unemployed among the educated, and thus the
macroeconomic impact is perhaps negligible.
20. Some authors argue that developing countries
should also try to tax their rich and successful migrant
workers abroad, by changing their tax rules to one based on
“nationality” (as in the case of Eritrea, the Philippines, and
the United States) from one based on “residence.” See Desai,
Kapur, and McHale (2001a) and Bhagwati (2003).
21. Such hurdles may include restrictions on or delays
in issuance of passports, access to foreign exchange to un-
dertake the initial travel, or simply lack of a communica-
tion infrastructure that slows down job search or results in
delays in finalizing job contracts. Political instability often
disrupts international migration. For example, the number
of Mozambican workers in South African mines dropped
by half around the period preceding and following
Mozambique’s independence from the Portuguese in 1975.
To some extent, this drop reflected mistrust of “leftist”
workers by South African mine owners, but to a large ex-
tent, it was also a result of disruption in passport issuance
by Mozambique authorities (Lucas 1987).
22. See Mattoo 2002 for a detailed discussion of vari-
ous aspects of this issue. The other three modes of GATS
are: “cross-border supply” (trade in goods), consumption
abroad (tourism or study abroad), and commercial presence
(supplying services through a branch abroad).
23. The industrial countries may respond to these ris-
ing migration pressures by relaxing immigration laws, in
particular, by encouraging more temporary migration (akin
to the U.S. H-1B visa).
24. A seven-year delay before workers from central
and eastern Europe are allowed to work in the EU has been
proposed, similar to the “transitional period” arranged for
Spain and Portugal when they entered the EU in 1985. Sev-
eral studies estimate that migration from these countries
into the EU would rise to about 2–3 percent of the popula-
tion of the sending country (see, for example, Boeri and
Brucker 2000), but others (Borjas 1999, Drinkwater 2002)
estimate smaller numbers. There appears to be a consensus,
however, that temporary movement of workers from these
countries will increase significantly.
25. One of the techniques devised to cope with the de-
teriorating external imbalance was a form of foreign bor-
rowing known as the “convertible Turkish Lira deposit”
scheme or the Dresdner Bank scheme. The program, dating
from the late 1960s, was designed to attract the savings of
Turkish nationals working in foreign countries and also the
cash deposits that might have been earned in black-market
trade, smuggling, or the mis-invoicing of imports and ex-
ports. According to the scheme, the Central Bank of Turkey
offered interest rates on foreign exchange deposited in
Turkish commercial banks 1.75 points above the Euromar-
ket rate while also guaranteeing the foreign exchange value
of both principle and interest. Beginning in 1975, the pro-
gram was broadened to allow nonresidents in general, and
not only Turkish nationals working abroad, to hold these
deposits. Foreign exchange receipts from this source were
transferred from commercial banks to the Turkish central
bank and on-lent to government and state enterprises, with
expansionary effects on the money supply. Inflation acceler-
ated markedly (still with a fixed exchange rate), worsening
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the underlying disequilibrium in the external sector. The
Dresdner deposits constituted short-term foreign loans, and
therefore the maturity of Turkey’s external indebtedness be-
came increasingly short term as the decade progressed, de-
spite earlier rescheduling intended to spread out debt servic-
ing over time. The scheme was withdrawn for a few years,
but reintroduced recently. At the end of 2001, such deposits
by Turks living in Europe amounted to $10 billion. See
Barth and Hemphill (2000).
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